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The established literature has argued that gasoline prices respond quickly to crude oil 
price increases, but adjust more slowly to crude oil price decreases (Bacon, 1991; Borenstein 
et al., 1997; Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003). This phenomenon has been referred to as rockets 
and feathers for the reason that gasoline prices ‘shoot up like rockets’ in the face of positive 
oil price shocks and ‘float down like feathers’ in response to negative shocks (Bacon, 1991). 
While the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis has predominantly been examined in the U.S. 
market, it has been investigated extensively in other non-US markets such as the Spanish fuel 
market (Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012) and the Australian petrol market (Valadkhani, 2013), 
just to name two countries by way of example.
1
  
Importantly the Australian study differs from the Spanish one in the use of weekly data 
rather than daily data.  Balaguer and Ripolles (2012) highlight the importance of using daily 
data on the basis that gas stations are able to adjust their prices daily, particularly given that 
gas stations set their prices according to the rapidly changing conditions in the wholesale fuel 
market. To that end, daily data would reveal more information about the retail price 
adjustment process. From an econometric standpoint, inadequate temporal disaggregation 
could result in the omission of important short time lags, which may introduce significant 
bias to estimates (Geweke, 1978). An important and well established finding is that estimates 
from average data per week also suffer from temporal aggregation bias (Bachmeier and 
Griffin, 2003; Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012). And as we document in our study, this temporal 
aggregation in weekly price series can give rise to a different stationary property compared 
with daily price series. An important implication of the difference in results about the mean-
reversion behavior of petrol prices is that it hinders the application of the long-run 
cointegration framework, which is commonly used for testing asymmetry in the retail price 
adjustments when it deviates from wholesale price. Consequently, there is a need to undertake 
further research that uses daily retail petrol prices in Australia. 
This paper critically evaluates the model used by Valadkhani (2013) in testing the 
rockets-and-feathers hypothesis for Australia’s petrol market. In addition to employing daily 
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 Other country studies include Liu et al. (2010) who examine price asymmetry for diesel and petrol in New Zealand, 
and Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) who test the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis in the Irish and UK petroleum 
and diesel markets.  
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data, which overcomes the temporal aggregation bias that has been documented in previous 
studies, this paper demonstrates the importance of testing for cointegration relationship 
between retail and wholesale petrol prices in the presence of a structural break, and the need 
for a robust model specification which captures important features of the data when testing 
for asymmetric responses of retail petrol price to wholesale price changes. To this end, we 
focus our analysis on the state of Queensland (QLD), a state which exhibited significant 
evidence of rockets-and-feathers behavior in retail petrol prices, apart from Tasmania (TAS) 
and New South Wales (NSW) (Valadkhani, 2013). QLD also has far more retail locations 
than TAS or NSW and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) combined.
2
  For the purpose of 
exposition, the general reference to petrol is with regard to unleaded petrol.  
Following the literature, Valadkhani (2013) estimates a long-run relationship between 
retail and wholesale petrol prices for which the resulting residuals from that regression form 
the error correction term which enters a second stage regression. Prior to running the second 
regression, he tests for the stationarity property of petrol prices. However, when neglecting to 
account for a structural break in the data, he erroneously concluded that the series are non-
stationary when in fact they are stationary with a regime shift in both intercept and trend. 
Furthermore, he tested for co-integration between retail and wholesale prices even though the 
two series are I(0). Unfortunately, he also used a wrong set of critical values based on the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller critical values rather than the appropriate critical values for 
cointegration test. The results yield erroneous conclusion about the stationarity property of 
the residuals obtained from the first stage regression. Be that as it may, Valadkhani continued 
to assess evidence of asymmetry using the second stage regression. Specifically, he relied on 
the feedback coefficients, which are associated with the error correction term that is proxied 
by the residuals. The idea is that these feedback coefficients measure the different speeds of 
adjustment when deviations from the long-run equilibrium occur. For reasons not explained 
by Valadkhani (2013), he assumes that the residual (or the error correction term) follows a 
Gaussian normal distribution. The assumption of normality implies a symmetric distribution 
which allows him to choose two threshold levels (i.e. 0.44σ and -0.44σ) that divide the 
distribution into three equal portions. Here, σ denotes the standard deviation of petrol prices. 
The upper (lower) portion of the distribution is associated with the error correction (or 
residual) value that is greater (lesser) than or equal to 0.44σ (-0.44σ), which he defined as 
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This study shows that the use of weekly data employed in Valadkhani (2013) fail to 
justify the application of a cointegration framework given the stationary property of petrol 
prices. In contrast, our results show that daily petrol prices exhibit non-stationary property 
when the regression specification used for testing a unit root properly accounts for a structural 
break in the data. For the 28 gas stations data examined, we find that only 15 retail prices 
display a long-run relationship with wholesale prices when a structural break is accounted in 
the cointegration regression. In addition, we show that the normality assumption imposed by 
Valadkhani (2013) on the error correction term and the residual of the regressions, are 
tenuous and that the data fail to support them. The Jarque-Bera test overwhelmingly rejects 
the null of normality in the resulting regression residuals of the 15 retail prices. A plot of their 
empirical distributions superimposed on a normal distribution visually suggests that the 
normality assumption is untenable. Since Valadkhani fails to establish the normality of the 
residual, there is a flow-on effect on the ad hoc determination of the threshold levels, which – 
contrary to his assertion - fail to demarcate the distribution into three equal portions. Given 
that the threshold levels are chosen incorrectly the test of the null hypothesis on the equality 
of the coefficients, which are associated with the different regions of the distribution would 
be erroneous. 
We present a model which better captures certain empirical features of the data compared 
to the one estimated by Valadkhani (2013). First, we establish that there is a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between retail and wholesale prices when a structural break is taken 
into consideration in the cointegration regression. Failure to accommodate a regime shift in 
the cointegration relationship can result in failure to reject the false null of no cointegration 
(Gregory and Hansen, 1996), which is corroborated in our findings. The resulting residual 
from this cointegration regression can be used to determine whether there is asymmetric 
adjustment in retail prices whenever the market is in disequilibrium. We also relax the 
assumption of normality in the distribution of the residual.  Given the evidence of departure 
from normality in petrol prices, we use a Student’s t-distribution. As we show in the 
sensitivity analyses, this assumption matters for correct inference. Secondly, there is no a 
priori reason other than for convenience that the threshold levels are chosen so as to divide 
the error distribution into three equal portions. It is common in the literature to employ zero 
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as the default threshold since positive and negative values can be easily associated with the 
different speeds of adjustment when the deviation is above or below the long-run equilibrium 
level.  
Rather than fix this threshold at zero, we consider an alternative approach which allows 
the data to determine the threshold level. This approach is similar to the threshold adjustment 
which is developed by Enders and Siklos (2001). Their method permits asymmetry in the 
speed of adjustment towards equilibrium with the threshold level purely determined by the 
data.  Having estimated the model, we test the null of equality in the coefficients which 
measure the speed of adjustment when the discrepancies are positive and negative from the 
threshold level. This forms the basis for testing the asymmetric price responses. Thirdly, the 
volatility specification of retail petrol prices is permitted to respond asymmetrically to the 
sign and size of the shocks. By appropriately modelling the empirical features in the data, we 
show that the results fail to support the pervasiveness of rockets-and-feathers behavior in 
petrol prices in the Queensland state as claimed by Valadkhani (2013). Our results provide 
new and robust evidence for the lack of asymmetric retail price adjustments, which has been a 
topic of significant interest by the public due to its implications for consumer welfare.
3
 Of the 
28 retail stations examined, only four retail petrol prices are found to exhibit asymmetric 
price adjustments. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data sources, explains the summary statistics of the data and 
preliminary results of the cointegration test and the empirical distribution of the resulting 
residuals. Section 4 presents the model, the procedure for determining the threshold and the 
test for asymmetric price responses. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the 
paper with a summary of the main arguments presented here.   
2. Literature Survey 
2.1 What gives rise to oil price asymmetric adjustments? 
Empirical observation of oil price asymmetric response to changes in wholesale prices 
can be rationalized by oil companies taking advantage of their dominant market power in an 
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 The social concern is based on studies documenting that oil companies have a propensity to take advantage of oil 
price variations in the international market. Their aim is to increase revenues by failing to adjust retail prices in 
accordance with movements of the wholesale prices. Consequently, consumers are expected to pay higher prices 
which reduce their welfare. (Galeotti et al., 2003; Contin Pilart and Correljé, 2009; Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012). 
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oligopolistic industry (Contín-Pilart and Correljé, 2009). The extent of price asymmetry 
depends on the number of competitors in the market; fewer competitors are associated with 
more price asymmetry. Oligopolistic markets exist due to high barriers to entry. Some 
barriers include the requirement for government licensing and large economies of scale that 
exist in the fuel market. Collusive behavior is thought to be a common practice in the 
oligopolistic fuel market where prices are set unfairly higher for consumers. Borenstein et al. 
(1997) show that tacit collusion is practised by firms in which they use past prices as a focal 
point to exploit market power. Tacit collusive behavior is an undeclared agreement, where 
collusion occurs either through excessive advertising or when a market leader sets a 
benchmark price for competitors to follow. In the event that wholesale prices increase, each 
retailer is quick to raise prices to signal to their competitors that they are following a tacit 
agreement. When upstream prices decline, firms are slow to adjust prices since they run the 
risk of signaling to competitors that they no longer follow a tacit agreement (Galeotti et al., 
2002).  As a result of collusion, this may lead to delayed price reductions but not price 
increases.  
Another possible explanation for oil price asymmetric adjustments is the break down in 
collusions amongst retail gas stations. Once retailers adopt a trigger strategy (resulting in 
temporary increase in market share for a particular firm), the slow gradual decline in retail 
price will soon lead to a rapid fall in prices to their competitive levels as firms compete for 
market share. If market power is indeed present and firms temporary practise this asymmetric 
pricing behavior, the situation is unlikely to last because firms are faced with consumer 
search costs in search for cheaper prices (Brown and Yücel 2000). As petrol prices change 
frequently, it is difficult for consumers to maintain accurate price information (Lewis 2011).  
Lewis (2011) has developed a reference point search model to illustrate that the amount of 
effort consumers spend on searching depends on their expectations of what prices should be, 
which are prices in the previous period. When wholesale prices increase, retailers act to 
maintain their profits by passing on the increase to consumers who notice that prices are 
higher than their reference point (i.e. the last period price). Consumers then begin to search 
for cheaper petrol prices that are in line with their expectations. Increased search effort leads 
to changes in the price elasticity of demand faced by firms, leading to smaller profit margins 
at each station, thus forcing prices to fall to their competitive levels.  Alternatively, when 
retail prices begin to decline as a result of falling wholesale prices, consumers will search less 
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because the price is either equal to or less than their reference point. Hence, the natural 
tendency is that consumers are willing to pay the first price they notice and do not search as 
much. This leads to a slower reduction in retail price which makes the market less 
competitive and firms experience higher margins in the short-term (Brewer et al., 2014).  
According to Brown and Yücel (2000), beyond market power and search costs, there are 
other explanations for the asymmetric price response of petroleum. Consumer responses to 
changes in petrol price can contribute to asymmetric price responses. Suppose there is a 
sudden depletion of crude oil or the Australian exchange rate is expected to depreciate (which 
was the case during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008), consumer demand for petrol would 
accelerate and induce further increases in rising prices. Retailers would experience temporary 
shortages in current inventories and be forced to increase prices rapidly to account for excess 
demand. As Brown and Yücel (2000) explained, firms may face adjustment costs, if oil 
supply is reduced; wholesalers have little choice but to reduce output quickly, which would 
lead to a rapid increase in retail prices. On the contrary, when crude oil supplies are increased, 
suppliers would not have to increase output quickly. They could delay price reduction by 
controlling the outflow of petroleum products, which could lead to delays in price reduction. 
2.2 Empirical evidence of oil price asymmetric adjustments 
Empirical results on petrol price asymmetry are mixed. Past studies have differed in terms 
of the variables examined, sample period used, the frequency of the data, estimation 
techniques employed and the country under scrutiny. The lack of a unifying framework for 
testing and examining petrol price asymmetry has led to the ongoing debate and development 
of novel modelling and testing approach in the literature. The pioneering work on analyzing 
price asymmetry is the study by Bacon (1991), which examines the United Kingdom’s fuel 
market using data from 1982 to 1989. Bacon discovers that retail prices appeared to rise faster 
to increases in the price of crude oil compared to when prices decline. Bacon (1991) was the 
first to coin the term “rockets and feathers” where prices rise like “rockets” and fall like 
“feathers” when changes occurred to the upstream supply of petrol.  
In another influential paper by Borenstein et al. (1997) who extensively study the 
distribution process for fuel in the United States, the authors analyze price transmission at 
different points in the distribution, such as crude oil-retail and wholesale-retail margins. They 
find an asymmetric relationship exists between wholesale and retail margins. In particular, 
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they find that crude oil retail asymmetry prices depend on a number of factors like the 
transporters, wholesale margins, and exchange rates, amongst others.  
In a related study, Radchenko (2005) examines the link between oil price volatility and 
asymmetry responses of gasoline prices to oil prices increases and decreases in the United 
States. He finds that the degree of asymmetry in gasoline prices declines with an increase in 
oil price volatility, which is consistent with the prediction offered by the oligopolistic 
coordination theory. Brewer et al. (2014) argue that many retailers prefer volatility in 
upstream prices. Specifically, when firms experience low profits at times of increasing 
wholesale costs, price cycles with higher price volatility had economically significant benefits 
especially when prices decline as retailers are able to make large short-term profits.  
For a state-specific study, Verlinda (2008) explores asymmetrical relationships in petrol 
prices in the state of California. The influence of geographical and product differentiation has 
shown that petrol prices rise faster for wholesale price increases than they fall for decreases in 
cost. It is found that local-market differentiation is associated with higher asymmetry than 
those without differing characteristics (brand of product), which would lead to potential 
market power. The results suggest that differentiated products offered to consumers wielded 
an influence on the degree of price asymmetry. 
Not all empirical studies which test the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon support this 
hypothesis. An early study conducted by Karrenbrock (1991) provides an example for the 
effects of wholesale price changes onto retailers using a distributed lag model. Karrenbrock 
finds that the lag effects are symmetric for leaded petrol using monthly data. Bachmeier and 
Griffin (2003) extend the work of Borenstein et al. (1997) by using both weekly and daily 
data for the U.S. market. The authors find evidence of asymmetry for the weekly series 
between crude oil and wholesale price deviations, however, when employing daily data, 
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) find no evidence of asymmetry for the margins.  
More recently, Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) have empirically tested whether the Irish 
and UK petroleum and diesel markets are subjected to asymmetric pricing. Employing a 
Threshold Autoregressive model (TAR) with monthly data, they find evidence to support the 
rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. On the other hand, Liu et al. (2010) examine the diesel and 
petrol industry in New Zealand, and they fail to find any evidence of price asymmetry 
between crude oil and wholesale prices for petroleum. Nevertheless, there is statistical 
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evidence of diesel prices responding asymmetrically to price increases and decreases. They 
rationalized that diesel prices are not as competitive as petrol because they are mainly used in 
the business sector of New Zealand, and to that end oil companies take advantage of the 
relatively inelastic demand for diesel by users. 
A survey of the literature on asymmetric fuel price responses to price increases or 
decreases is extensive and it is not possible to include all of them in this section. Nonetheless, 
our survey of the literature highlights a number of critical issues that need to be addressed 
when assessing the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. Fundamentally, the econometric model 
needs to be sufficiently flexible to capture empirical features of the data. Alongside the 
model, equally important is the data frequency that is employed to empirically test the 
hypothesis. It appears that the use of a disaggregated dataset (i.e. daily) is preferred by many 
researchers since it captures better variation in oil price movements (Polemis and Fotis, 
2013). However, in many cases daily data can be difficult to obtain due to data unavailability. 
In this paper, we take issue with these two fundamental issues of data frequency and model 
specification to demonstrate that they matter for the assessment of the rockets-and-feathers 
hypothesis. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 The Data 
The dataset is purchased from Fueltrac (www.fueltrac.com.au) and specifically focuses on 
the state of Queensland, Australia for the period from 29 October 2007 to 30 April 2014, 
which comprises 2377 daily observations.
4
 Daily data are obtained given that retailers are 
able to adjust their prices daily. Additionally, using a more disaggregated data like daily data 
would permit a closer examination of the price variation and reveal information about the 
behavior of retailers, which would otherwise be masked when using weekly or monthly data 
as is commonly reported in most studies. In total there are 28 retail and 5 wholesale locations 
in the Queensland dataset. 
There are two prices of interest, namely retail prices and terminal gate prices (TGP) or 
wholesale prices. Terminal gate prices (TGP) are the spot prices where fuel can be purchased 
by retailers located close to the wholesale distributor. Petroleum either comes from domestic 
                                                          
4
 The source of the dataset is similar to the one used by Valadkhani (2013). However, Valadkhani employs weekly 
data and for a shorter period from 29 October 2007 to 30 January 2012. 
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refineries or is imported from international port terminals.  There are two price benchmarks 
that are important in determining the terminal gate prices (TGP). They are the import parity 
prices (IPP) and wholesale prices (ACCC Monitoring of the Australian Petroleum Industry 
2014, p.61). The IPP is the cost of importing refined petrol where this index is used as a 
margin for determining domestic wholesale prices. The IPP plays a central role in 
determining prices where movements in this index can have a major influence on the 
downstream supply chain. Given that Singapore is the major source of imported fuel which 
makes up approximately 40% of the Australian market, Singapore’s wholesale prices are 
closely followed as a benchmark to determine domestic prices. In sum, terminal gate prices 
can be decomposed into the following constituents: 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐼𝑃𝑃 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝑆𝑇) + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 
-Figure 1 about here- 
In Australia, except for Western Australia, retailers are free to adjust prices on a daily 
basis. Changes to daily retail prices are influenced by international prices for fuel, the 
Australian exchange rate, taxes and variations in wholesale and retail margins.  Dispersions in 
retail prices can vary substantially between regional and metropolitan areas. Retailers who 
operate further away from their wholesale distributors such as regional retailers are on 
average expected to offer a higher pump price in comparison to city retailers. One reason for 
this is that regional retail stations only experience fuel deliveries every two to three weeks in 
comparison to city stations, which usually take delivery every week since retailers operating 
in metropolitan areas experience a higher quantity demand for petroleum than those in 
regional areas. Furthermore, distance travelled by delivery trucks also has an influence on the 
retail cost margins when determining the daily pump price. Generally, the further away a 
service station operates from its nearest wholesale distributor the higher are the freight costs 
which are transferred onto the final price. Changes in the production and wholesale margins 
for petrol tend to have the highest influence on the price offered by retailers. In summary, it 
can be seen in Figure 1 that the average national price of petrol for 2012-2013 is made up of 
the refined production cost accounting for 56% of retail price, followed by government taxes 
which account for 36% of retail price. The remainder consists of wholesale and retail cost 
margin. 
-Figures 2 and 3 about here- 
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Evidence of daily seasonality is present in the data and hence a seven-day moving average 
is applied to remove the influence of seasonal patterns. Plots of the movement of retail and 
wholesale prices are depicted in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Figure 2 shows the retail prices 
in Queensland from 28 retailers. The colored lines represent the prices offered by retailers 
across the state. It can be seen that at any point in time, the variation in petrol price offered by 
retailers is substantive. These price differences can be attributed to retailers’ geographical or 
location differences. In contrast, the 5 terminal gate prices illustrated in Figure 3 show no 
signs of large price dispersions from each other. This is not surprising given that the majority 
of the wholesale distributors operate close to the shoreline. Figure 4 shows a map of 
Queensland in which the retail locations denoted by green triangles were matched with their 
closest wholesale supplier and distributors marked by red diamonds, namely Brisbane, 
Cairns, Gladstone, Mackay and Townsville. It is evident that all wholesale suppliers are 
located along the shoreline. The graphs for retail and terminal gate prices show that these 
prices are somewhat moving in tandem suggesting that a cointegration relationship could 
exist between them. Furthermore, there is a large fall in petrol prices around about 2008, 
which may suggest the presence of a structural break that would need to be accounted for 
when undertaking both the unit root and cointegration tests.  
-Figure 4 about here- 
3.2 Data Summary Statistics 
Tables 1 presents the summary statistics for retail and wholesale locations, respectively, 
from 4/11/2007 to 30/4/2014.  Based on the average retail prices, five of the most expensive 
locations are Cloncurry ($1.55), Charleville ($1.48), Cunnamulla ($1.48) Longreach ($1.47), 
and Mt. Isa ($1.45). On the other hand, the least expensive retail locations were Brisbane 
($1.36), Caloundra ($1.36), Ipswich ($1.36), Toowoomba ($1.33) and Warwick ($1.36). 
These price differences should not come as a surprise since retailers that offer higher prices 
tend to be located in regional Queensland compared to cheaper locations operating closer to 
their nearest wholesale distributors. Differences in the average price offered by petrol stations 
can also be a result of different economies of scale arising from population density, travel 
distance and competition. 
-Tables 1 about here- 
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The kurtosis for the distribution of petrol prices in 28 locations is less than zero, 
suggesting that the distribution is broader, flatter, and has thinner tails than a Gaussian normal 
distribution. Many of the statistics are statistically different from zero, which is the value of 
the kurtosis for a normal distribution. Moreover, all of the distributions are negatively skewed 
implying that the distribution is non-symmetric. Given the evidence of skewness and non-
normal kurtosis, the Jarque Bera test statistic for the null of normal distribution is 
comfortably rejected at the 1% level of significance for all retail and wholesale prices in all 
locations. 
We also undertake unit root test and cointegration tests with and without structural breaks. 
Results of the unit root Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test without structural breaks are not 
reported here for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request. To 
endogenously determine the break when testing for stationarity, we use the Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) test (ZA test, henceforth). Table 2 shows the results of the ZA test and as 
anticipated allowing structural breaks in the intercept gives rise to a break that coincides with 
the suspected break in September 2008. However, in all cases, we fail to reject the unit-root in 
favor of stationarity with one break for wholesale and retail prices in all locations.  
-Tables 2 and 3 about here- 
Since both retail and wholesale prices are non-stationary, and the fact that both price 
series are seen to move together closely (see Figures 1 and 2), we test for a cointegration 
long-run relationship by accommodating a structural break. The test for cointegration is 
performed between a retail price and its closest wholesale price using both the Engle and 
Granger (1987) (EG, henceforth) procedure and the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) (GH, 
henceforth) procedure, which accommodates a structural break. The shift in intercept, the 
trend term and the slope coefficient are permitted in the model specification with a structural 
break. For an exposition of the cointegration regression with a structural break in practice, the 
reader is referred to Gregory and Hansen (1996b). Table 3 reports the results for the 
cointegration analysis among the pair of retail and wholesale prices for both EG and GH 
procedures. Gregory and Hansen (1996b) utilize the method of Mackinnon (1991) to calculate 
the approximate asymptotic critical values for regime shift in the cointegration relationship. 
Appropriate lags were chosen for the specification based on minimizing the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The EG test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no 
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cointegration in 5 of the 28 locations (i.e. Brisbane, Caboolture, Caloundra, Gold Coast and 
Ipswich) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the series are cointegrated. For the GH test 
statistic, only 15 of the 28 locations show evidence of cointegration between the retail and 
wholesale prices. Given that cointegration exists only in these 15 retail locations, our 
empirical assessment of the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis is restricted to these retail prices. 
Although the precise timing of the breaks varies, the breaks are identified to occur around 
mid-2008, which coincides with the global recession.
5
 These results also demonstrate that 
failing to account for a structural break can lead to over-rejection of the null of no 
cointegration, leading to spurious findings of cointegration between retail and wholesale 
petrol prices.  
-Table 4 about here- 
At this point it is worth comparing our results with that of Valadkhani (2013). In his 
study, Valadkhani started his analysis on the premise that the retail price and wholesale price 
series are cointegrated, and he tested for evidence of cointegration by performing a unit root 
test on the resulting residuals from the regression. A drawback in his approach lies with the 
use of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) critical values to test the null hypothesis that the 
residuals are non-stationary (i.e. there is no cointegration between retail and wholesale 
prices).
6
 The ADF critical values are not valid given that the residuals are themselves 
estimates. Appropriate critical values would need to be obtained from simulation. Engle and 
Granger (1987) report the critical values under the null that the residuals are non-stationary. 
Mackinnon (1991) provide the approximate asymptotic critical values for the Engle and 
Granger (1987) test using a procedure which involves fitting a response surface. Table 4 
reports the results of the cointegration test done by Valadkhani using weekly prices.  
It is apparent from these results which are based on the Dickey-Fuller critical values, 
sixteen retail prices are cointegrated with the terminal gate prices at conventional levels of 
significance. However, when the correct critical values are used, only two retail prices are 
shown to be cointegrated with the terminal gate prices at the 10% significance level. One 
implication of Valadkhani’s results is that if the residuals are shown to be non-stationary as 
                                                          
5
 The global financial recession caused demand for energy to shrink in late 2008, with oil prices collapsing from the 
July 2008 high of $147 to a December 2008 low of $32. 
6
 The ADF critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level are -3.46, -2.88 and -2.57, respectively (see 
Table 3 of Valadkhani (2013)). These are simulated critical values obtained for a sample size of 250 observations for 
a regression that includes a constant but no trend. 
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evidenced by the use of the appropriate critical values, then it makes little sense to include the 
residuals from the cointegration regression in the second stage regression. In particular, given 
that the regression is spurious, inference about the asymmetric adjustment in retail prices 
when there are disequilibria in the market is in doubt. Clearly, a re-assessment of the rockets-
and-feathers hypothesis in the Queensland state is warranted. Further, Valadkhani (2013) fail 
to perform a cointegration test with structural break(s), implying that his cointegration test 
results may be biased not only by the use of wrong critical values but also as a result of model 
misspecification. 
4. The Empirical Model 
Having established the presence of a cointegration relationship between the price of 
unleaded petrol prices and its cost, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡               (1) 
where (𝑃𝑗𝑡) is the retail price and (𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡) is the wholesale prices at time t at the i
th
 location for 
i=1,…,5, and j
th
 location for j=1,..,28. The time trend variable 𝑇  captures the average 
increases in related costs associated with the distribution of petrol like transport, insurance 
and storage (Bacon, 1991). The intercept denotes the level of existing costs for a particular 
location j. Here, 𝐷𝑗  is a dummy variable which equals one from the date when a structural 
break occurs to the end of the sample period and zero for the period prior to the break. The 
unobserved error term (ejt) represents the exogenous shocks in the model, which displays the 
deviations from the long run equilibrium. Moreover, this residual term is essential for 
analyzing the presence of asymmetric adjustment when there are petrol price increases and 
decreases which cause retail price to deviate from the wholesale price. Both retail and 
wholesale prices are expressed in Australian cents per litre. For brevity, we do not report the 
regression results but they are available from the author upon request. 
The short-run dynamic which takes into account possible asymmetric price adjustments 
can be determined by estimating the following Threshold Error Correction (TEC) model. The 
second stage regression is:  















Here, ∆𝑃𝑗𝑡 measures the first difference of the j-th retail location price. The first difference of 
terminal gate prices are given by ∆𝑃𝑊𝑑𝑡−𝑖. To ensure that the residual 𝑣𝑗𝑡 is purged of any 
serial correlation, we fit an ARMA(k,q) model. The 𝐸𝐶𝑗𝑡−1  measures the error correction 
term which is given by the one period lagged valued of the residuals obtained in regression 
(1) for the j-th retail location. The threshold value which is determined by the data is denoted 
by 𝜏𝑗 for the j-th retail location. The notation ≥ 𝜏𝑗 (< 𝜏𝑗) which appears as a superscript in the 
error correction term denotes the value of the residuals which is larger than or equal to (lower 
than) the threshold value. The coefficients of interest which capture the asymmetric price 
adjustment to price increases and decreases are 𝜌1𝑗 and 𝜌2𝑗, respectively. In general, the value 
of 𝜏𝑗 is unknown and needs to be estimated along with the values of 𝜌1𝑗 and 𝜌2𝑗 . However, in 
the literature on testing for asymmetric price adjustment, it seems natural to set 𝜏𝑗 = 0 so that 
the cointegrating vector coincides with the attractor. In such circumstances, the adjustment is 
𝜌1𝑗𝐸𝐶𝑗𝑡−1
≥𝜏𝑗
 if the lagged residual value is above the long-run equilibrium and 𝜌2𝑗𝐸𝐶𝑗𝑡−1
<𝜏𝑗
 if the 
lagged residual value is below the long-run equilibrium. Failure to reject the null of equality 
in the magnitude of these two point estimates (i.e. 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗) would imply that there is no 
asymmetric price adjustment in petrol prices. 
While setting 𝜏𝑗 = 0 may seem a natural and convenient approach when testing for price 
asymmetry, there is no a priori reason to expect the threshold to coincide with the attractor. 
When estimating the unknown 𝜏𝑗, Chan (1993) demonstrated that searching over the potential 
threshold values so as to minimize the sum of squared errors from the fitted model yields a 
superconsistent estimate of the threshold. To employ Chan’s methodology, the estimated 
residual series resulting from regression (1) was sorted in ascending order such that ej1 <
ej2 < ⋯ < ejT where T denotes the number of usable observations. The largest and smallest 
15% of the {ejt} values were discarded and each of the remaining 70% of the values were 
considered possible thresholds. For each of these possible thresholds, we estimated an 
equation in the form of (2). The estimated threshold yielding the lowest residual sum of 
squares was deemed to be the appropriate estimate of the threshold.  Inference concerning the 
individual values of  𝜌1𝑗 and 𝜌2𝑗, and the restrictions 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 is problematic when the true 
value of the threshold 𝜏𝑗 is unknown. The property of asymptotic multivariate normality has 
not been established for this case. In discussing the difficulty of establishing the distribution 
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of the parameter estimates, Chang and Tong (1989) conjectured that utilizing a consistent 
estimate should establish the asymptotic normality of the coefficients.    
 Note that our approach differs from Valadkhani (2013) in two important ways. Firstly, we 
do not make any assumption about the normality in the residuals. In fact, we assume that 𝑢𝑗𝑡 
follows a Student’s t distribution. Secondly, the thresholds are not pre-determined by dividing 
the distribution into three different regions, which are separated by -0.44σj and 0.44σj. As we 
have documented in the data and summary statistics section, these pre-determined threshold 
values do not divide the distribution into three equal portions since the distribution departs 
from normality and there is evidence of skewness and kurtosis in the distribution.  
 Thirdly and finally, it is possible that the price series may exhibit autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effects (Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012). We model the 
conditional variance of 𝑢𝑗𝑡  in equation (2) as a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH (1,1)) model: 
ℎ𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑗 + 𝛿1𝑗 𝐽𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿2𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑡−1                                                                                            (3) 
To accommodate the potential larger impact of negative shocks on return conditional 
variance, which is usually termed the asymmetric leverage volatility effect, we also estimate 
the GJR model developed by Glosten et al. (1993): 
ℎ𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑗 + 𝛿1𝑗 𝐽𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿2𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑗 𝑗𝑡−1
2  𝐼( 𝑗𝑡−1 < 0)                                                    (4) 
where 𝐼( 𝑗𝑡−1 < 0) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the shock is negative and 
zero otherwise. Here, a negative unit shock elicits a larger response in the conditional 
variance by (𝛿1𝑗 + 𝛿3𝑗) compared to only 𝛿1𝑗 for a positive unit shock. Wei et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that oil price volatility displays asymmetric volatility. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Empirical features of the cointegration regression residuals 
Figure 5 depicts the plot of the residuals obtained from the cointegration regression. A 
cursory look at this plot suggests that the empirical distributions of these residuals are not 
normal. For this reason, the assumption made by Valadkhani (2013) that -0.44σj and 0.44σj 
would divide the distribution equally into three portions is in doubt. Equally, the different 
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underlying empirical distribution of the residuals would suggest that the threshold value 
𝜏𝑗  would differ from one retail station to the next. For this reason, it is important to estimate 
the threshold value from the data. 
-Figure 5 and Table 5 about here- 
Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the residuals from the cointegration regression. 
It can be seen that by and large the residuals are negatively skewed and the kurtosis ranges 
from 2 to 4. More importantly, the Jarque-Bera test overwhelmingly rejects the null of 
normality in all cases thus confirming our suspicion about the departure from normality in the 
regression residuals as shown in Figure 5. An important implication of these results is that the 
approach taken by Valadkhani (2013) who assumes that the residuals are normally distributed 
and the use of an ad hoc approach to divide the supposed normal distribution into three equal 
portions, cannot be justified. 
5.2 How prevalent is the asymmetric response in petrol prices in Queensland? 
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates of the threshold error correction model given by 
equation (2). The estimate for 𝜌1𝑗  denotes the adjustment coefficient when the difference 
between the retail price and the wholesale price is larger than or equal to 𝜏𝑗 , while the 
estimate for 𝜌2𝑗  denotes the adjustment coefficient when the difference between the retail 
price and the wholesale price is smaller than 𝜏𝑗. By and large these values are statistically 
significant and different from zero, except in some instances such as Cairns and Charter 
Towers for 𝜌1𝑗  and Cairns for 𝜌2𝑗  for which they are not statistically different from zero. 
Another interesting observation is that the magnitude of the |?̂?1𝑗 | tends to be larger than |?̂?2𝑗| 
in 8 out of 15 cases, which implies that the speed of adjustment is more rapid for positive 
than for negative discrepancies from ?̂?𝑗. When we test the null hypothesis that 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗, of 
the eight cases where we found |?̂?1𝑗|>|?̂?2𝑗 |, only in six retail stations, namely Brisbane metro, 
Bundaberg, Caboolture, Caloundra, Gold Coast, and Ipswich do we reject the null at the 5% 
significance level. Taken together, the results suggest that in these six retail stations we fail to 
find support for the assertion that petrol prices fall more slowly during price increases and 
increase faster during price decreases.  With respect to the other two retail stations which 
were found to exhibit |?̂?1𝑗|>|?̂?2𝑗|, the test for the null hypothesis of 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 does not find 
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support that there are statistically significant differences in the speed of adjustments for 
positive and negative discrepancies from ?̂?𝑗.   
Finally, referring to the other seven retail stations which display |?̂?1𝑗|<|?̂?2𝑗 | in the petrol 
price adjustments, the test for the null hypothesis of 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 is rejected for Dalby, Hervey 
Bay, Toowoomba and Warwick.
7
 In other words, for the state of Queensland we find that the 
evidence for asymmetric response of retail prices in the rate of adjustment toward long-run 
equilibrium is less prevalent than was previously reported by Valadkhani (2013). Of the 28 
stations examined in this study, only 4 retail stations present evidence of asymmetric price 
responses to petrol price increases and decreases.  
-Table 6 about here- 
 The threshold estimate 𝜏𝑗 varies significantly from station to station. To ensure that these 
threshold levels are comparable, we standardize them by dividing the threshold estimate with 
its standard deviation. The standardized threshold is denoted by 𝜏𝑗
∗. It can be seen from these 
estimates that the assumption of a zero threshold is untenable except in the case of Gladstone 
which indicates that 𝜏𝑗
∗ = 0.0075. The value of 𝜏𝑗
∗ tends to be different from 0 and it varies 
from -1.01 in Dalby to 1.18 in North Coast.  
 The degree of freedom estimate, 𝑣 , also varies substantially with the highest value 
registering for Gladstone (5.182) and the lowest for Brisbane metro, Caloundra and Gold 
Coast (2.000). This parameter estimate is statistically significant in all cases implying that the 
assumption of a Student’s t distribution is well supported by the data. The low estimate of 𝑣 
with most estimates reporting a value of around 2 implies that the distribution has a lower 
peak than a normal distribution otherwise would have. In the next subsection we describe the 
implication of adopting a normal distribution on inference about the asymmetric price 
adjustments.  
There is no pervasive evidence of asymmetric volatility in petrol price returns. Referring 
to the coefficient estimate of 𝛿3𝑗, the only case when 𝛿3𝑗 estimate is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% level is for Hervey Bay and Cairns, respectively. Petrol price return volatility 
                                                          
7
 Although Charter Towers rejects the null hypothesis of 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 , the value of 𝜌1𝑗  is not different from zero 
implying that when there is positive discrepancies from ?̂?𝑗 there is no adjustment towards long-run equilibrium.  
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documents asymmetry at the 10% level for Caloundra and Toowoomba. This would imply 
that a GARCH(1,1) model may be adequate in modelling return volatility for most of the 
other retailer petrol prices. 
5.3 Sensitivity analyses 
(a) Weekly data 
 To determine the degree by which our results would differ with the use of weekly data, 
we calculate the weekly average of the daily data. Preliminary analysis of the series using the 
Zivot-Andrews test suggests that there exists a structural break around about October or 
November of 2008.  And when this regime shift is accounted for in the intercept and trend of 
the regression, the resulting test statistic overwhelmingly rejects the null of stationarity in 
favour of a stationary series with a regime shift. Table 7 shows the results of the Zivot-
Andrews test which support this conclusion. One important implication of these results is that 
we cannot proceed to test for asymmetric adjustments in retail petrol prices using the long-run 
cointegration framework. More importantly, our results for Queensland point to possible 
erroneous inference which Valadkhani (2013) obtained by using standard unit root tests 
which fail to account for a structural break. In fact, a cursory look at the data plots for both 
unleaded petrol prices and terminal gate prices (see Figure 3 and 4, respectively on pp.73 of 
Valadkahni, 2013) show that there is a visible structural break around about October and 
November of 2008. These results cast doubt on the evidence of asymmetric petrol price 
adjustments reported in Valadkhani (2013) study.  
 -Table 7 about here- 
(b) The assumption of a Normal distribution 
  We estimate the threshold error correction model with the assumption of a Gaussian 
normal distribution and symmetric volatility. The results which are reported in Table 8 Panel 
A suggest that there is no evidence of asymmetric price adjustment toward long-run 
equilibrium that is consistent with the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. Although we observe 
that the estimate of 𝜌1𝑗 is smaller in magnitude than 𝜌2𝑗 for the case of Bundaberg, Gladstone 
and Townsville, and that the null hypothesis of 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 is rejected in all the three cases, it is 
noteworthy that the parameter estimates ?̂?1𝑗  and ?̂?2𝑗  are not statistically significant and 
different from zero in some instances. The contrast in results compared with the model which 
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assumes a Student’s t distribution is stark, but more importantly, they suggest that failing to 
specify an appropriate underlying distribution of the data generating process can lead to 
erroneous inference.   
-Table 8 about here- 
(c) Daily data and neglecting a regime shift in the cointegration regression 
 An important consideration in our evaluation of the asymmetric adjustment in retail petrol 
price towards the wholesale price is the presence of a structural break in the cointegration 
relationship. We undertake the empirical analysis by deliberately failing to account for a 
regime shift in the cointegration relationship between petrol retail and wholesale prices. For 
brevity, we report the estimation results of the threshold error correction model which pertain 
to the coefficients 𝜌1𝑗  and 𝜌1𝑗, and the results for the test for the null hypothesis 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 
(see Table 8, Panel B). It can be seen that there are only two instances when |𝜌1𝑗| < |𝜌2𝑗|, 
that is for Hervey Bay and Toowoomba. However, the null hypothesis 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 is rejected at 
the 5% significance level only for Toowoomba. Taken together, the results underreport the 
number of cases which exhibits asymmetric adjustment in petrol prices. Our results suggest 
the importance of correctly identifying the presence of structural breaks in the data when 
undertaking an evaluation of the asymmetric price adjustment in petrol prices.        
6. Conclusion 
The empirical study conducted in this paper is motivated by concerns over the negative 
effect on consumer welfare when petrol prices remain high despite falling wholesale prices. 
The pervasiveness of the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon in Australia was brought to light 
by Valadkhani (2013) who finds that more than a third of the retail gas stations in Queensland 
exhibit asymmetric price revision towards long run equilibrium when there are market 
disequilibria. We revisit the empirical framework he employed to determine his findings. We 
take issue with a number of untenable assumptions and the failure to establish a cointegration 
relationship between retail petrol price and the wholesale price while accommodating a 
regime shift in that relationship, which lead to the finding of a disproportionately large 
percentage of retail gas stations displaying the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon.  
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Our contributions lie in developing a robust and at the same time more general model 
which demonstrates that the asymmetric price revision does not have to be governed by a 
threshold level that is set to zero. In fact, our estimation results indicate that the threshold 
level which underpins the difference in the price revision arising from positive and negative 
discrepancies from the threshold level is different from zero. Through a more general and 
robust characterization of the behavior of petrol prices which allows for a structural break, 
our results suggest that daily petrol prices adjust asymmetrically to terminal gate price 
changes only in 4 of the 28 retail gas stations. It is therefore implied that the rockets-and-
feathers phenomenon in Queensland is not as pervasive as previously reported. Our results 
also caution on possible biases in inference when failing to appropriately account for certain 
empirical features of the data such as neglecting a structural break in the unit root test and the 
cointegration specification, misspecification of the underlying distribution and using weekly 
data which are subjected to temporal aggregation bias. 
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Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum National Average 2012  
 
 
Retail Price Components: 

































  Figure 3  Deseasonalized Terminal Gate Prices of 5 Wholesale Distributors in Queensland 
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Note: The red diamonds denote the approximate locations of the wholesale distributors while the green triangles denote the location of the cities or towns 
associated with various petrol retailers. 
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Figure 5 Empirical Distribution of the Cointegration Regression Residuals 
 
Note: The solid line which is superimposed on the histogram is the normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation that corresponds to the 











Standard dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Brisbane 129.71 12.44 -0.33*** -0.45 62.99*** 
Cairns 132.48 12.56 -0.34*** -0.49*** 70.61*** 
Gladstone 132.38 12.50 -0.33*** -0.48*** 66.72*** 
Mackay 132.99 12.66 -0.35*** -0.53*** 74.90*** 






Standard dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Brisbane 136.96 13.64 -0.56*** -0.14 128.21*** 
Bundaberg 138.36 13.60 -0.48*** -0.72***  144.97*** 
Caboolture 137.40 13.82  -0.54*** -0.21** 121.02*** 
Cairns 139.86 14.77 -0.65*** -0.29*** 174.64*** 
Caloundra 136.43 13.55 -0.56***  -0.11 122.91***  
Charleville 148.23 11.89 -0.56*** -0.22** 130.47***  
Charters 
Towers 
141.75 13.23 -0.80*** -0.07 253.46*** 
Cloncurry 155.04 15.12 -0.68*** -0.40*** 197.49*** 
Cunnamulla 148.08 13.90 -0.65*** -0.57*** 198.64*** 
Dalby 137.10 15.63 -0.50***  -0.52***  124.92*** 
Emerald 140.66 14.12  -0.75*** -0.27*** 227.51*** 
Gladstone 139.51 13.27 -0.55*** -0.13 121.65*** 
Gold Coast 137.17 13.29 -0.57*** -0.07  128.41***  
Goondiwindi 140.10 14.66 -0.71*** -0.43***  217.01***  
Gympie 137.58 13.85  -0.73*** -0.15 214.88***  
Hervey Bay 138.28 13.10 -0.64***  -0.23** 167.34*** 
Ipswich 136.85 13.32 -0.61***  -0.07  145.27*** 
Kingaroy 138.18 14.03 -0.62***  -0.28 158.38*** 
Longreach 147.27 14.34 -0.61*** -0.43***  159.18*** 
Maryborough 138.04 13.01 -0.60*** -0.31*** 153.71*** 
Mackay 137.75 14.45 -0.69*** -0.22**  193.88*** 
Mt. Isa 145.28 14.08 -0.57***  -0.58*** 163.54*** 
North Coast 137.36 13.15 -0.67*** -0.13 177.51*** 
Rockhampton 141.51 13.62 -0.71*** -0.09 198.20*** 
Roma 142.14 13.50 -0.93*** 0.44*** 361.77*** 
Toowoomba 133.93 14.51  -0.67*** -0.32*** 185.17*** 
Townsville 137.33 14.56 -0.74***  -0.03 218.29*** 
Warwick 136.60 13.64 -0.82*** 0.17* 270.95*** 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the null hypothesis that the skewness and kurtosis are equal to zero is rejected at the 










Break date Test Statistic k (lags) 
Brisbane 2008:09:11 -2.31 4 
Cairns 2008:09:13 -2.29 4 
Gladstone 2008:09:13 -2.28 4 
Mackay 2008:09:13 -2.34 4 
Townsville 2008:09:13 -2.31 4 
Retail Locations    
Brisbane 2008:09:13 -2.46 4 
Bundaberg 2008:09:30 -2.52 4 
Caboolture 2008:09:15 -2.65 4 
Cairns 2008:09:16 -2.91 3 
Caloundra 2008:09:05 -2.99 4 
Charleville 2008:09:26 -1.72 4 
Charters Towers 2008:09:22 -2.80 3 
Cloncurry 2008:10:01 -2.59 4 
Cunnamulla 2008:09:27 -2.46 4 
Dalby 2008:09:22 -2.96 4 
Emerald 2008:09:24 -2.88 4 
Gladstone 2008:09:29 -2.62 4 
Gold Coast 2008:09:12 -2.58 4 
Goondiwindi 2008:10:01 -2.63 4 
Gympie 2008:09:03 -3.45 4 
Hervey Bay 2008:09:18 -2.41 3 
Ipswich 2008:09:15 -2.44 4 
Kingaroy 2008:09:30 -2.96 2 
Longreach 2008:09:19 -2.84 1 
Maryborough 2008:09:08 -2.88 3 
Mackay 2008:10:05 -2.26 4 
Mt Isa 2008:09:06 -2.83 3 
North Coast 2008:08:30 -3.64 2 
Rockhampton 2008:09:30 -2.37 4 
Roma 2008:09:23 -3.25 3 
Toowoomba 2008:09:26 -2.70 4 
Townsville 2008:09:23 -2.55 4 
Warwick 2008:09:03 -3.09 4 
Note: The critical values for ZA test with a break in the intercept are -5.57 and -5.08 at the 
1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. k denotes the number of lags in the regression 
specification which is determined according to the AIC. *, ** and *** indicate that the null 







Table 3 Cointegration Test Results With and Without a Structural Break  
                               Engle-Granger Test             Gregory-Hansen Test  
  Locations t-statistic   t-statistic Break date k  
BRISBANE 
 
        
Brisbane 5.30***   -8.31*** 2008:06:11 1 
Bundaberg -2.46   -6.07*** 2008:10:23 1 
Caboolture -5.15***   -8.50*** 2008:02:07 1 
Caloundra -5.09***   -8.57*** 2008:07:10 2 
Charleville -1.68   -4.53 2008:07:06 3 
Cunnamulla -1.72   -4.73 2008:11:02 4 
Dalby -2.09   -5.69** 2008:06:14 2 
Gold Coast -5.27***   -8.97*** 2008:05:06 1 
Goondiwindi -1.61   -4.27 2008:07:10 4 
Gympie -1.62   -5.40 2008:09:01 3 
Hervey Bay -1.91   -5.95** 2008:05:15 1 
Ipswich -5.02***   -8.60*** 2008:07:21 1 
Kingaroy -1.78   -5.48 2008:10:21 3 
Maryborough -2.30   -5.17 2008:11:05 3 
North Coast -2.92   -6.19*** 2008:04:03 1 
Roma -1.79   -4.72 2008:06:08 2 
Toowoomba -2.29   -5.55** 2008:04:02 1 












Emerald -1.74   -4.85 2008:03:21 2 
Gladstone -2.03   -5.74** 2008:11:11 2 
Longreach -1.73   -4.79 2008:05:16   












Charters Towers -2.22   -5.62** 2008:10:30 3 
Cloncurry -2.10   -5.02 2008:10:25 3 
Mt. Isa -2.59   -5.89 2008:10:25 3 
Townsville -2.24   -5.89** 2008:10:18 2 
Note: All retailers are paired with the closest wholesaler, which is marked in bold. The critical values for the 
EG test at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels are -4.70,-4.14,-3.85 , respectively.  The critical values for the 
GH test at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels are -6.45,-5.96,-5.72, respectively. The GH critical values are 
asymptotic approximation calculated by Gregory and Hansen (1996b). k signifies the number of lags as 








Table 4 The Cointegration Test Results Reported in Valadkhani (2013) 








Critical Value  
Brisbane Metro -3.14** -3.14   -3.46 (1%) -4.70 (1%)  
Bundaberg -2.46 -2.46   -2.88 (5%) -4.14 (5%)  
Caboolture -2.83* -2.83   -2.57 (10%) -3.85 (10%)  
Caloundra -2.34 -2.34      
Cairns -2.80* -2.80     
Charters Towers -2.45 -2.45     
Cunnamulla -3.79***   -3.79      
Dalby -3.21** -3.21      
Emerald -2.88* -2.88     
Gladstone -2.24 -2.24     
Gold Coast -3.06** -3.06      
Goondiwindi -4.11*** -4.11*      
Gympie -2.15 -2.15      
Hervey Bay -2.43 -2.43      
Ipswich -2.85* -2.85      
Kingaroy -2.01 -2.01      
Longreach -2.74* -2.74     
Mackay -4.02*** -4.02*     
Maryborough -1.96 -1.96      
Mt. Isa -2.98** -2.98     
North Coast -2.72* -2.72      
Rockhampton -2.78* -2.78     
Roma -2.82* -2.82      
Toowoomba -2.04 -2.04      
Warwick -3.37** -3.37      
 Note: The t-statistic values and the ADF critical values are obtained from Table 3 of Valadkhani 
(2013). The Engle and Granger (EG) critical values are obtained from Mackinnon (1991, Table 1) 
corrected critical values for the case with two variables, a constant and a trend. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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location Kurtosis Skewness 
Jarque-
Bera Test 
Brisbane Metro Brisbane 2.6593 -0.6245 164.737*** 
Bundaberg Brisbane 2.6593 -0.6245 19.854*** 
Caboolture Brisbane 2.6677 -0.5093 112.824*** 
Caloundra Brisbane 2.9451 -0.6702 177.032*** 
Dalby Brisbane 3.8495 0.0642 72.437*** 
Gold Coast  Brisbane 3.0695 -0.6935 189.707*** 
Hervey Bay Brisbane 3.1912 -0.5449 120.131*** 
Ipswich Brisbane 3.1255 -0.7804 241.016*** 
North Coast Brisbane 3.3190 -0.5665 179.065*** 
Toowoomba Brisbane 2.8760 0.2247 21.331*** 
Warwick  Brisbane 3.6371 -0.3538 88.952*** 
Cairns Cairns 3.7209 -0.0028 51.035*** 
Gladstone Gladstone 3.8385 -0.6395 229.525*** 
Charters 
Towers Townsville 3.2558 -0.2705 35.136*** 
Townsville Townsville 3.7343 -0.0471 53.783*** 




Table 6 Coefficient Estimates of the Threshold Error Correction Model with Student’s t Distribution 
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The parameter estimates correspond to the coefficient estimates in equations (2) 
and (4). k denotes the lag length of the autoregressive terms which are the first difference of retail prices and the first difference of wholesale prices. 𝜏𝑗
∗denotes 
the standardized threshold value which is obtained by dividing the threshold value 𝜏𝑗 with its standard deviation. 𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗  is the test for the null that there is 










Break date Test Statistic k (lags) 
Brisbane 2008:10:26 -8.25*** 3 
Cairns 2008:10:26 -8.23*** 3 
Gladstone 2008:10:26 -8.29*** 3 
Mackay 2008:10:26 -8.27*** 3 
Townsville 2008:10:26 -8.19*** 3 
Retail Locations    
Brisbane 2008:10:26 -6.13*** 3 
Bundaberg 2008:11:02 -6.57*** 4 
Caboolture 2008:10:26 -6.16*** 3 
Cairns 2008:10:26 -7.49*** 3 
Caloundra 2008:10:26 -5.83*** 3 
Charleville 2008:10:05 -6.68*** 3 
Charters Towers 2008:10:05 -6.68*** 3 
Cloncurry 2008:11:02 -6.30*** 2 
Cunnamulla 2008:11:02         -5.92*** 4 
Dalby 2008:11:02 -7.71*** 1 
Emerald 2008:11:02 -7.42*** 3 
Gladstone 2008:10:26 -7.44*** 1 
Gold Coast 2008:11:02 -6.14*** 3 
Goondiwindi 2008:10:26 -6.48*** 2 
Gympie 2008:11:02 -6.11*** 3 
Hervey Bay 2008:11:02 -6.79*** 2 
Ipswich 2008:11:02 -5.97*** 3 
Kingaroy 2008:11:02 -6.68*** 3 
Longreach 2008:10:26 -7.29*** 3 
Maryborough 2008:10:19 -7.08*** 3 
Mackay 2008:11:02 -6.72*** 2 
Mt Isa 2008:10:26 -6.67*** 4 
North Coast 2008:10:26 -6.41*** 3 
Rockhampton 2008:10:26 -7.36*** 3 
Roma 2008:10:26 -7.11*** 2 
Toowoomba 2008:10:26 -7.27*** 3 
Townsville 2008:10:19 -6.50*** 2 
Warwick 2008:10:26 -6.75*** 4 
Note: The critical values for ZA test with a break in the intercept are -5.57 and -5.08 at 
the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. k denotes the number of lags in the 
regression specification which is determined according to the AIC. *, ** and *** 
indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 










Table 8 Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
 
  
Panel A: Normal distribution 
with a structural break 
Panel B: Daily data 












Brisbane Metro Brisbane -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0804 -0.0060*** -0.0040*** 4.3115* 
4.311* 
 
Bundaberg Brisbane -0.0019** -0.0022 11.0072*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 9.3840*** 
Caboolture Brisbane 0.0000 -0.0005 6.1577** -0.0253*** -0.0136*** 0.0013 
Caloundra Brisbane -0.0222*** -0.0139*** 16.7631*** -0.0103*** -0.0022 17.0262*** 
Dalby Brisbane -0.0070 -0.0061 7.8746*** -0.0018 -0.0027** 12.2815*** 
Gold Coast  Brisbane -0.0351 -0.0282 3.0075* -0.0100*** -0.0051*** 11.5490*** 
Hervey Bay Brisbane -0.0123 -0.0036 21.5329*** -0.0047*** -0.0061*** 6.6151* 
Ipswich Brisbane -0.0144 -0.0118 2.4068 -0.0122*** -0.0062*** 17.4379*** 
North Coast 
Qld 
Brisbane -0.0281*** -0.0078* 13.9388*** -0.0053*** -0.0029*** 4.4507* 
Toowoomba Brisbane -0.0028 -0.0026 0.1112 -0.0012*** -0.0027*** 17.5223*** 
Warwick  Brisbane -0.7470*** -0.0011 7.8879*** -0.0018*** 0.0002 12.4601*** 
Cairns Cairns -0.0027 -0.0009 10.0408*** 0.0000 -0.0005** 7.0024*** 
Gladstone Gladstone -0.0015 -0.0057*** 7.9323*** -0.0040*** -0.0030*** 1.9260 
Charters 
Towers 
Townsville -0.0065 -0.0116* 7.8746*** -0.0011*** -0.0012 0.3983 
nsville Townsville -0.0024 -0.0082* 12.7471*** -0.0034*** -0.0026*** 6.5285* 
     
   
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  𝜌1𝑗 = 𝜌2𝑗 is the test for the null that there is equality in the 
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